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HIGHLIGHTS 
- We investigate the effects of Germany’s AT on passenger numbers  
- Counterfactual predictions of passenger numbers in the absence of AT are estimated 
using the synthetic control method  
- Results indicate that AT has been associated with significantly decreased passenger 
numbers at most German airports, with exception of large hubs, and growth in 
passenger numbers at airports in bordering countries 
Abstract:  
The German Aviation Tax (AT) is a tax levied on departing passengers from German 
airports. The synthetic control method is used to generate counterfactual passenger numbers 
for German airports, and for airports outside Germany but near the German border. The 
results presented are consistent with cross-border substitution of passenger demand in 
response to AT. Most AT exempt airports near the borders have made sizable, significant, 
gains in passenger numbers since Germany introduced AT. Within Germany there appears to 
be a clear distinction in the impact on small/regional airports and that on larger hubs.  
JEL Classification:  
H26, H30, L93  
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1. Introduction  
 
Aviation tax (AT) regimes in Europe receive considerable attention. Germany’s AT was 
introduced on 1st January 2011 and remains payable on departures from all German airports 
at a cost of €7.47, €23.32, or €41.99 depending on the distance flown1. While often motivated 
as environmental taxes, common perception is that revenue raising is the key driver of ATs. 
Airports and airlines often spearhead campaigns for their abolition, citing adverse effects on 
demand, competitiveness and connectivity2. Germany’s Economy Minister is reportedly 
swaying toward abolition for these reasons3.  
In this paper, we investigate the impact Germany’s AT has had on passenger numbers using 
German airports and airports outside Germany but near the border (henceforth referred to as 
bordering airports). Specifically, we use the synthetic control method of Abadie et al. (2010) 
to construct counterfactual series for each airport of interest, representing passenger numbers 
under the alternative scenario that AT was never introduced. The impact of AT is then 
estimated as the gap between actual passenger numbers since 2011 and the synthetic 
numbers.  
We estimate changes in passenger numbers that can be attributed to AT for German airports 
and for bordering airports outside of Germany. Airports are modelled separately to see 
whether the effects of the AT might differ across airport types. Results indicate more 
passengers used bordering airports after the introduction of German AT, while most German 
airports, with the exception of hubs, saw a negative impact of AT on passenger numbers.  
Our main contribution is to the relatively scarce literature on the impact of aviation taxes on 
passenger numbers. A few case studies (Gordijn and Kolkman 2011, and Steverink and van 
Daalen 2011) assess the effects of the Dutch aviation tax, introduced in 20084. Using the 
average passenger growth rate as comparison, Gordijn and Kolkman (2011) estimate that the 
introduction of the aviation tax can be associated with a 6.9% reduction in passenger numbers 
at Amsterdam Airport. Using a linear extrapolation of passenger numbers at different 
airports, they also estimate that approximately one million Dutch passengers started using 
bordering airports as a consequence of the tax. Their analysis is complicated by two main 
                                                          
1 Listed in Annex 1 and 2 of the German Aviation Tax Act (2011).  
2 See Edinburgh Airport (2015). 
3 See DW “German Air Passenger Tax Under Increased Fire” August 2017. 
4 The Dutch AT was abolished a year later.  
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factors: the 2008/09 economic crisis coinciding with the taxation period and the short amount 
of time during which the tax was in place. Furthermore, it is unclear how reliable their 
counterfactual passenger number estimations are: linear extrapolations might not be accurate 
in the presence of shocks (or non-linear passenger trends) while using European passenger 
growth rates as counterfactuals might not capture region-specific differences in passenger 
trends.  
Our empirical approach, which uses the synthetic control method to estimate counterfactual 
passenger numbers, can provide robust estimates of counterfactuals for a number of reasons. 
First, this method optimises the selection of comparison (control) airports so that 
counterfactual passenger numbers are based on the control airports most similar to treated 
airports in terms of passenger trends. Second, in the optimisation process, it uses covariates 
that control for regional and macroeconomic shocks to passenger numbers. To our 
knowledge, this paper is the first case study on aviation taxes that employs the synthetic 
control method. This approach is particularly suitable for our analysis as it allows us to 
construct reliable counterfactuals using aggregate level data5.  
Through our findings we also contribute to the literature on the determinants of air passenger 
demand and airport choice (see for example Graham 2000, Brons et al. 2002, Jankiewicz and 
Huderek-Glapska 2016, or Valdes 2015). Only a few studies (Pels et al. 2003, Steverink and 
van Daalen 2011) consider the impact aviation taxes have on the airport choices of 
passengers. These studies are however mostly theoretical in their approach. Our paper 
therefore contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence that passengers6 are 
highly responsive to the introduction of aviation taxes, and by finding some evidence (albeit 
only at the aggregate level7) that passengers change airport preferences in response to these 
taxes.  
Furthermore, our analysis contributes to the literature on cross-border shopping (Joossens and 
Raw 1995, Nielsen 2001, Asplund et al. 2007). This strand of the tax policy literature 
focusses on the way tax differences across borders affect the preferences and choices of 
consumers. Our results contribute to the literature by finding evidence for a specific case of 
                                                          
5 Indeed, according to Abadie et al. (2015) the most relevant application of the synthetic control method is for 
comparative case studies that use aggregate data. A diff-in-diff estimation, where control group selection is 
largely arbitrary, would be likely biased by the large structural differences between treated and control airports 
(these are in different countries and might be affected by different market forces).  
6 In the specific German case.  
7 Detailed micro-data on individual tax liabilities and flight ticket prices would be necessary to assess micro-
level impacts of changing air taxes on airport choices. Data of this kind was not accessible for our study.  
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cross-border shopping: our results show that aviation tax differences across borders can have 
a noticeable impact on air passenger movements between the bordering countries. More 
specifically, we find that the introduction of the AT in Germany can be associated with a 
substantial increase in passengers at tax-free airports near the German border.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises the relevant policy 
background. Section 3 describes the data and outlines the empirical approach. Section 4 
shows the results. Section 5 assesses the plausibility of our findings. Section 6 provides a 
discussion of our findings. Section 7 concludes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
2. Background   
 
The German aviation tax (AT) was introduced on 1st January, 2011. The AT is charged after 
passengers departing from German airports. There are three different unit taxes charged 
based on distance flown: €7.47, €23.32, or €41.998 is charged for short, medium, and long-
distance flights, respectively. According to forecasts by Berster et al. (2010), the number of 
passengers expected to belong to each tax category was (at the time of introduction) 62.3, 2.9, 
and 8.9 million, respectively.  
This indicates that9 roughly 84% of passengers can be expected to pay a unit tax of €7.47, 4% 
of passenger can be expected to pay €23.32, and 12% of passenger can be expected to pay 
€41.99. Consequently, passengers on short and long-distance flights will contribute to the 
vast majority of tax revenues from AT. The average passenger departing from a German 
airport faced a tax increase of €12.2510.  
Upon the introduction of the tax, some experts warned (see Steppler 2011) that the German 
AT was likely to have the same adverse effect on passenger numbers than the Dutch version 
of the tax introduced a few years earlier. The AT remains controversial to this day with 
frequent calls for its abolition by industry participants and policy makers11.  
  
                                                          
8 See Annex 1 and 2 of the German Aviation Tax Act 2010.  
9 Unfortunately no data is available to estimate these numbers for all of our sample years. The estimation above 
is based on 2008 data.  
10 This is the weighted average of the unit taxes considering the shares of passengers traveling under each 
distance band. We do not have data on prices and therefore do not know whether this tax change was passed on 
to passengers (and to what extent).  
11 See for example DW, German Air Passenger Tax Under Increased Fire, August, 2017.  
6 
 
3. Data and Identification Strategy   
 
We assess the impact of the German AT on passenger numbers by estimating counterfactual 
series of passenger numbers for each treated airport – the counterfactual numbers correspond 
to a scenario where no aviation tax was introduced. The choice of ‘treated’ airports, for which 
we believe AT may have had an impact, are German international airports and bordering 
airports (located outside Germany but within two hours driving time12). The latter group 
allow us to investigate potential spill-over effects from AT. To assess why AT might have 
had a different impact at some airports in comparison to others, we estimate separate models 
for each airport. For treated airports, we compare actual (observed) passenger numbers to 
counterfactual ones after the introduction of AT to assess the impact of the tax.  
To estimate counterfactual passenger numbers, we use the synthetic control method (Abadie 
et al. 2010). The synthetic control method constructs counterfactuals (also referred to as 
synthetic controls) using a weighted average of passenger numbers at ‘control’ airports. 
Control airports are airports where no changes in aviation taxes took place during our sample 
period13. The controls are chosen for their ability to predict passenger numbers at ‘treated’ 
airports in the pre-tax period. Furthermore, covariates are included in the estimation to 
control for variation arising from other factors that affect passenger numbers (regional and 
macroeconomic variables).  
In summary, the counterfactual estimation is optimised based on: 1) the extent to which 
passenger trends in the pre-AT period are similar between treated and control airports and 2) 
the extent the process through which changes in covariates feed into changes in passenger 
numbers is similar for treated and control airports. For example, there is some process 
through which changes in purchasing power are reflected in changes in passenger numbers 
(in the pre-AT period) for a treated airport. For the counterfactual, our approach will use the 
control airports that are the best at reproducing this process during the pre-tax period. Our 
counterfactual will therefore incorporate, through the covariates, shocks14 that affect 
passenger numbers.  
                                                          
12 According to Google Maps. 
13 Information on aviation tax regimes is from EBAA, A Snapshot of European Aviation Taxes, September 2015. 
14 Shocks to passenger numbers that are not captured by the covariates could however bias our estimations, 
especially if they coincide with the AT period (see below).  
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The covariates included are: purchasing power per capita in euros at the NUTS2 regional 
level15, to control for the impact of macroeconomic shocks; and lagged passenger numbers, to 
capture airport specific trends, where the chosen lags are selected based on the best fit 
between counterfactual and actual passenger numbers in the pre-tax period. Annual data on 
passenger numbers using each airport over the period 2003-2015 are from Eurostat16. 
To avoid biased estimates, we need to make restrictions to our data. Austrian airports are 
excluded, since Austria also introduced an AT in 2011. The Netherlands introduced an AT in 
July 2008 but abolished it a year later. Rather than exclude all Dutch airports we first 
estimated series for their passenger numbers under the counterfactual assumption that they 
never introduced AT, then used these data in place of actual numbers going forward, with the 
aim of then isolating the impact of German AT on each Dutch airport17. As a check on the 
plausibility of these results the Appendix includes models for Dutch airports without the 
Dutch AT adjustment.  
Furthermore, while we do control for macroeconomic/regional shocks and airport specific 
time trends through our covariates, a limitation of our approach is that we cannot control for 
idiosyncratic shocks affecting passenger numbers at treated airports. If these coincide with 
our treatment period, we could wrongly contribute their impact to the introduction of AT. For 
this reason, we exclude airports that we know to have undergone major capacity expansions 
or reductions in years corresponding to the AT period. For example, Frankfurt Airport is 
excluded due the expansion of their terminals in 2012, which increased the annual capacity of 
their terminal by 6 million passengers18.    
Treated airports are shown in Figure 1 along with an indication of catchment area, 
represented by a circle with a radius of 150km. Blue dots represent airports excluded due to 
data/model limitations or other post-intervention shocks to passenger numbers. 
 
 
                                                          
15 Eurostat data.  
16 These data concern both departing, arriving and transfer passengers, which is a limitation since that the tax is 
charged on departing passengers.  
17 This procedure relies on the assumption that the temporary Dutch AT had no long-run effects.  
18 See Frankfurt Airport Press Release “Frankfurt Airport Opens Pier A-Plus as Scheduled” October 2012.  
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Figure 1. Map of Airports and Catchment Areas 
 
Note: German airports and catchment areas are shown in green; bordering airports/catchment areas in red; and blue points 
with no label indicate airports excluded from estimation.  
 
Criteria used in selecting control airports include: located in a country with no change in 
AT19 over the period; but otherwise similar characteristics to the treated airports (Abadie et 
al. 2010). Chosen controls therefore vary across the treated airports (full details are provided 
in the Appendix, along with the selected weighted averages used in order to create the 
synthetic passenger number series). Following Billmeier and Nannicini (2013), two sets of 
estimates were constructed in each case: set A use control airports from countries 
surrounding Germany under the assumption that treated and control units are likely to face 
similar macroeconomic and regional shocks; while set B use a larger number of control 
airports from across the EEA. The preferred results are those from whichever set of estimates 
provides the best fit for the pre-tax period (as in Ormaechea et al. 2017).  
                                                          
19 A list of ATs is provided by European Business Aviation Association.  
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4. Results  
 
Full results of the synthetic control estimates are provided in the Appendix. Here we show 
results for two airports by way of examples.  Figures 2 and 3 plot actual and counterfactual 
(synthetic) passenger numbers for Amsterdam and Nuremberg respectively. The impact 
associated with the introduction of AT corresponds to the vertical difference (gap) between 
the actual and counterfactual time trends after 2010. The imposition of AT in 2011 is 
associated with increased passenger numbers relative to the counterfactual  in the case of 
Amsterdam, and decreased numbers in the case of Nuremberg.  
 
Figure 2: Examples of Synthetic Control Estimates 
Amsterdam Nuremberg 
  
 
Figure 3 summarises the full set of results for the treated airports, by plotting the post-tax 
percentage deviations of actual passenger numbers as compared to the counterfactual. The 
plotted figure is the average over the post-tax sample, 2011-2015, in each case. 
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Figure 3. Post-Tax Deviations from Counterfactual Passenger Numbers (Treated Airports) 
Bordering airports are marked red. 
 
Most German airports appear on the right of the figure, indicating estimated passenger losses 
since AT’s introduction. Most bordering airports, shown in red, made gains. A small number 
of German airports, notably Berlin Tegel, Dusseldorf and Munich saw gains in passenger 
numbers relative to the no tax counterfactual.  
Aggregating the results shown in Figure 3 for German airports provides us with an estimate 
of 7.3 million passengers lost compared to the counterfactual scenario under the assumption 
of no AT.  This is less than 1% of total passenger numbers at these airports during the post-
tax period so indicates rather a small effect on aggregate passenger demand.  
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5. On the Plausibility of the Findings   
 
To check the plausibility of our findings we: provide information on pre-tax fit of models; 
explore the sensitivity of results to the choice of control airports; and provide information on 
the significance of our estimates based on placebo tests.  
The fit of synthetic control models in the pre-tax period is measured using Root Mean 
Squared Prediction Errors (RMSPE) - constructed from the squared difference between actual 
and counterfactual passenger numbers for each pre-tax year, averaged across the available 
pre-tax years. The normalised RMSPE adjusts for airport size so is expressed as a % of that 
airport’s passenger numbers in 2010; a figure in excess of 5% is indicative of poor fit and 
signals that estimates of the impact of AT must then be treated with caution. 
The check on the sensitivity of results considers whether estimated impacts of AT are 
affected by the inclusion/exclusion of particular airports in the set of controls. Similar 
estimated impacts are indicative of robustness.  
Inference on significance of estimated effects comes from placebo tests, following Abadie et 
al. (2010). First the AT treatment is assigned to each control airport and impacts estimated. 
Since no AT was actually introduced for these airports we expect any estimated impacts to be 
small and random. Essentially, we have confidence in our results for treated airports if their 
estimated post-tax gaps are large relative to those generated in the placebo tests.  
We use RMSPE ratios to construct p-values. RMSPE ratios are measured as the post-tax gap 
(between actual and counterfactual passenger numbers) divided by the pre-tax gap. These 
ratios indicate the extent to which post-tax gaps are large in comparison to the pre-tax fit of 
our counterfactuals. Each p-value then indicates the likelihood that a randomly selected 
RMSPE ratio from the sample of placebo tests is larger than that of the given treated airport. 
It is simply the number of RMSPE ratios from the placebo group that exceed the ratio for the 
treated airport, and divided by the number of control airports in the group. For example, if the 
treated airport’s RMSPE ratio is larger than the ratio for all of its control airports (say there 
are 50 of them), the p-value is going to be equal to 0/50 = 0.  
Significance can be interpreted as indicating AT was associated with a greater than random 
effect on passenger numbers for specific airports. Lack of significance also has a clear 
implication: that passenger numbers at the given treated airport were not significantly 
affected by AT.  Recall though that these inferences must be predicated on well-fitting 
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models that are reasonably robust to the choice of controls. Table 1 summarises our findings. 
Most of our airport estimates are based on well-fitting synthetic control models and are 
robust.   
In Table 1, airport results marked bold are based on ill-fitting synthetic control models (or 
estimates that lack robustness). The small number of airports falling under this category tend 
to be regional airports, with low annual passenger numbers. It is possible that passenger 
number changes at these airports are too idiosyncratic20 to be modelled appropriately.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
20 Since these airports serve very few airlines and destinations, a single airline changing routes or schedules 
might have a substantial impact on passenger numbers.  
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Table 1. Summary of Robustness/Inference Measures: 
 
Airports  Pre-estimation 
error (% of 
passengers) 
Sample 
Robustness  
Check  
RMSPE 
Ratio 
p-value  
Berlin Schonefeld  2.55 N/A 2.85 0.167 
Berlin Tegel  3.73  20.71 0.000*** 
Bremen  2.96  12.91 0.021** 
Cologne 1.12  22.81 0.000*** 
Dortmund 3.21  7.35 0.170 
Dresden 3.05  10.76 0.000*** 
Dusseldorf  0.94  11.39  0.000*** 
Erfurt  22.1  2.98 0.381 
Frankfurt Hahn  3.29  10.37 0.085* 
Friedrichshafen  2.49  2.30 0.523 
Hamburg  1.68  4.65 0.563 
Hannover  3.26  6.10 0.191 
Karlsruhe  7.86  1.91 0.766 
Leipzig  2.08  14.35 0.000*** 
Munich  0.37  27.06 0.000*** 
Munster  0.62  52.24 0.000*** 
Nuremberg  0.48  264.8 0.000*** 
Paderborn  8.84 N/A 6.65 0.176 
Stuttgart   2.04  4.48 0.563 
Amsterdam  0.12  22.13 0.000*** 
Basel  3.98  10.95 0.063* 
Billund  2.16  7.60 0.170 
Brussels  1.78  3.84 0.600 
Charleroi  6.59  4.49 0.333 
Eindhoven  0.00  169.09 0.000*** 
Luxembourg  3.08  13.19 0.021** 
Maastricht  25.8  2.70 0.381 
Metz  8.32  4.95 0.143 
Prague  1.54 N/A 10.76 0.133 
Rotterdam  9.02  5.14 0.300 
Saarbrucken  10.07  6.24 0.143 
Szczecin  16.02  1.52 0.714 
Zurich  3.27  1.21 0.714 
Results marked bold are based on ill-fitting synthetic control models. N/A indicates that the Stata algorithm (synth) used to 
calculate synthetic controls was not able to estimate one of the sample models. 
***Significant at 1% level, **5%, *10% 
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6. Discussion  
 
The findings set out above are consistent with the likely behavioural responses of agents to 
increases in AT.  
a) That bordering airports are estimated to have benefited from AT is consistent with 
passengers switching to alternative airports to avoid ticket prices that incorporate AT. 
Such effects will be strongest when German and non-German airport catchment areas 
overlap (see Figure 1).  
b) Behavioural responses of airlines may have intensified such effects. Indeed, even 
assuming full pass-on of taxes into ticket prices, the average tax increase of €12.25 
from the tax does not warrant the magnitude of the response seen for some airports21. 
It is possible however, that the response of airlines, especially low-cost ones, have 
exacerbated the impact of AT. Anecdotal evidence from the Dutch and German AT 
cases point to some airlines having responded to an anticipated drop in demand by 
relocating their services to airports outside the AT area. Such responses ought to be 
strongest among budget airlines, since they are less tied to hubs and able to relocate 
quickly (see Thelle and la Cour Sonne 2017). Of course, the elimination of some 
destinations from regional airports forces travellers to shift their custom elsewhere. 
Our estimates are consistent with these explanations: smaller, regional airports 
(predominantly serving low-cost airlines) lost proportionately more passengers after 
the AT introduction. In fact, nearly all airports on the right end of Figure 3 - airports 
with the largest losses in passenger numbers from AT - fall under this category.  
c) Estimates for hubs airports within Germany show either no significant effects 
(Hamburg) or positive and significant impacts of AT (Berlin Tegel, Dusseldorf, and 
Munich). Greater resilience of passenger numbers at hubs in the face of AT is 
consistent with a lower price elasticity of demand. This is likely to be associated with 
a greater proportion of passengers flying on business trips, see Hess and Polak (2005), 
greater proportion of untaxed transfer passengers, fewer offerings from budget 
airlines, less opportunities to substitute to non-taxed routes, and a greater attachment 
of non-budget airlines to particular hubs (so less likelihood of a supply side response). 
It is also possible that hubs within Germany gain from substitution away from budget 
                                                          
21 Some airports have lost over 50% of their passengers. It is unlikely for there to be such a large demand side 
response given the size of the tax increase.  
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airlines induced by the latter’s reduction in offerings from German regional airports 
and from substitution induced by the relatively larger proportionate change in budget 
airline’s ticket prices, since the AT due varies only by distance, not by service level.  
 
 
7. Conclusions  
 
The synthetic control approach has provided estimates of the effects of German AT on 
passenger numbers using German airports and airports outside Germany but near the border.  
Estimates indicate that AT has significantly reduced passenger numbers, relative to the 
counterfactual of zero AT, for many German airports, though passenger numbers tended to 
hold up at and even grow somewhat at some hub airports. At the same time, most bordering 
airports gained passenger numbers. These findings are consistent with likely and mutually 
reinforcing behavioural responses of passengers and airlines to AT and the induced changes 
in the relative prices of airline services. Future research is needed to disentangle these 
behavioural responses.  
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Table 1. Synthetic Control Weights and RMSPE – Smallest Airport Group   
Control weights 
and RMSPE  
ERF FDH SCN  MST ETZ SZZ 
RMPSE 67.41 14.21 42.02 58.62 19.40 43.98 
Aarhus 0 0.347 0.047 0.075 0 0 
Alexandropoulos  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Antwerp  0 0 0 0.646 0 0 
Bastia 0 0 0.088 0 0 0 
Beziers 0 0 0.592 0 0 0.5 
Brno  0 0.176 0 0 0 0.5 
Chambery  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chios  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Coruna  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Jerez  0 0.103 0 0 0.029 0 
Kalamata  0.692 0 0.176 0 0.784 0 
Karpathos  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Karup  0 0 0 0.218 0 0 
Kavala  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kefallinia 0 0 0 0 0 0 
La Rochelle  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nimes  0 0.204 0.005 0 0 0 
Ostrava  0 0.223 0 0 0 0 
Preveza 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Samos  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Skiathos 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Zakintos  0.308 0.165 0.272 0.062 0.186 0 
Zaragoza  0 0.005 0.218 0 0 0 
5 
 
Table 2. Synthetic Control Weights and RMSPE – Small Airports (Sample B1)  
 
                                                          
1 Airports included are the ones from the two samples (Sample A and B) that had better fits. Synthetic control 
models with worse fits are not included for brevity’s sake.  
Control 
weights and 
RMSPE  
BRE DTM HHN HAJ FKB FMO NUE BLL BSL EIN LUX RTM PAD CRL 
RMPSE 78.79 56.33 114.5 166.2 91.51 8.02 19.69 54.27 168.7 0.001 49.77 83.91 86.45 341.5 
Aalborg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.473 0 0.179 0 0 
Almeria 0 0 0 0.295 0 0.180 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Asturias 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Bastia 0.517 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.542 0 0.001 0.699 0 0 0.34 
Biarritz 0 0 0 0 0 0.153 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Bilbao 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.198 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bordeaux 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bratislava 0 0.223 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.098 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Burgas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.004 0 0 0 0 
Chania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Coruna 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Faro 0 0 0.005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.005 
Gdansk 0 0 0.218 0 0 0 0 0 0.384 0.009 0 0 0 0.218 
Girona 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.041 0.115 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Goteborg 0 0 0 0.705 0 0 0.274 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Granada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Heraklion 0 0 0.176 0 0 0 0.214 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.176 
Ibiza 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Jerez 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Kerkira 0 0 0 0 0 0.428 0 0 0 0 0.203 0.193 0 0 
Kos 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Larnaka 0.003 0 0 0 0 0 0.136 0.172 0 0 0.098 0 0 0 
Lille 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Ljubljana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Malmo 0 0 0 0 0 0.093 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0.282 0 
Menorca 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Murcia 0 0.093 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.224 0 0 0 0 
Nantes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Pafos 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Porto 0.407 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.529 
Reus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.137 0 0 0.003 0 0 0 0 
Riga 0 0 0.077 0 0 0 0 0 0.219 0.085 0 0 0 0.13 
Rodos 0 0 0.325 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Santander 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Santiago 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Santorini 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.003 0 0 0 0 
Sevilla 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Sofia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Stockholm B 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Tallin 0 0.489 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.005 0 0 0 0 
Thessaloniki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Timisoara 0 0 0 0 0.713 0 0 0 0 0.136 0 0 0 0 
Valencia 0 0.088 0.199 0 0 0 0 0 0.299 0 0 0 0 0 
Varna 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Vigo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Vilnius 0 0.110 0 0 0 0.02 0 0.171 0 0.033 0 0 0 0 
Wroclaw 0.073 0 0 0 0.287 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Zakintos 0 0 0 0 0 0.125 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.628 0.718 0 
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Table 3. Synthetic Control Weights and RMSPE – Medium Sized Airports (Sample B)  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Synthetic Control Weights and RMSPE – Large Airports (Sample B)  
Control 
weights and 
RMSPE  
MUNICH 
(MUC) 
AMSTERDAM 
(AMS) 
ZURICH 
(ZRH)  
RMPSE 130.15 54.32 747.5 
Barcelona 0 0.207 0 
Copenhagen 0 0.213 0 
Geneva  0.573 0 0.769 
London H  0 0.228 0 
Madrid  0.261 0 0 
Orly   0 0 0.202 
Palma   0 0 0 
Paris CDG  0.166 0.352 0.028 
Stockholm  0 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Control 
weights and 
RMSPE  
TXL CGN DUS  HAM STR PRG BRU 
RMPSE 562.11 111.03 179.28 218.69 189.87 177.54 301.8 
Alicante 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 
Athens 0 0.001 0 0.071 0 0 0 
Budapest 0 0.394 0 0 0.391 0.637 0 
Copenhagen 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 
Geneva  0.151 0.001 0.012 0 0 0.363 0.146 
Helsinki  0 0.210 0 0.726 0 0 0 
Lisboa  0.423 0.002 0.653 0.192 0 0 0 
Lyon  0.317 0.001 0 0 0 0 0.301 
Malaga  0 0.227 0 0 0.438 0 0 
Marseille 0 0.041 0 0 0 0 0 
Nice 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 0.108 
Orly  0.11 0.027 0.335 0 0 0 0.445 
Palma  0 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 
Stockholm M  0 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 
Toulouse  0 0.091 0 0.011 0.171 0 0 
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Table 5. Synthetic Control Weights and RMSPE – Airports selected from Sample A  
 
 
 
  
Control 
weights and 
RMSPE  
BERLIN-S 
(SXF) 
DRESDEN LEIPZIG  
RMPSE 186.72 57.52 59.29 
Aalborg 0 0.437 0 
Bastia  0 0 0.017 
Bordeaux  0 0.441 0 
Gdansk 0.118 0 0 
Lyon   0.47 0 0 
Marseille   0.412  0 0.280 
Montpellier  0 0.122 0.213 
Nantes  0 0 0.057 
Toulouse   0 0 0 
Wroclaw  0  0 0.433 
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Table 6. RMSPE Ratios - Control Airports (Sample A):  
Airport   RMSPE Ratio 
Aalborg 0.77 
Aarhus 2.18 
Bastia 1.01 
Bordeaux 1.02 
Copenhagen 1.8 
Gdansk 4.66 
Lyon 2.38 
Marseille 2.41 
Montpellier 0.89 
Nice 2.1 
Nantes 4.3 
Orly   0.83 
Prague 1.32 
Toulouse   1.32 
Vienna   1.56 
Wroclaw  1.44 
 
 
Table 7. RMPSE Ratios - Control Airports (Sample B):  
Table 7.1. Small Airports Group  
Airport   RMSPE Ratio 
Aalborg 4.33 
Almeria 4.11 
Asturias 2.14 
Bastia 0.43 
Biarritz 10.55 
Bilbao  4.07 
Bordeaux  2.38 
Bratislava  11.32 
Burgas  8.23 
Chania  2.1 
Coruna  4.3 
Faro  0.83 
Gdansk  1.34 
Girona    5.37 
Goteborg   1.56 
Granada  1.44 
Heraklion  3.73 
Ibiza  6.11 
Jerez  2.34 
Kerkira  9.68 
Kos  5.34 
Larnaka  6.37 
Lille 3.59 
Ljubljana  1.02 
Malmo  2.92 
Menorca  3.30 
Murcia  2.44 
Nantes  6.11 
Pafos  4.67  
Porto  6.16 
Reus  3.00 
Riga  20.28 
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Rodos  5.89  
Santander  11.06 
Santiago  4.87 
Santorini  4.54 
Sevilla  4.25 
Sofia  0.22 
Stockholm  8.91 
Tallin  1.88 
Thessaloniki  7.69 
Timisiora  6.94 
Valencia  3.58 
Vigo  4.00 
Vilnius  1.92 
Wroclaw  5.83 
Zakintos  1.80 
 
Table 7.2. Medium Sized Airport Group   
Alicante  6.17 
Athens  15.86  
Budapest  7.01  
Copenhagen 3.55 
Geneva  6.45 
Helsinki  11.42 
Lisboa  3.32 
Lyon  5.86  
Malaga  1.07  
Marseille  5.50  
Nice  1.25 
Orly  Could not be estimated  
Palma  8.47 
Stockholm Main  10.76 
Toulouse  1.68 
 
Table 7.3. Large Airports Group   
Barcelona  6.72 
Copenhagen  4.29 
Geneva  Could not be estimated  
London H   4.90 
Madrid  1.59 
Orly  14.93 
Palma  Could not be estimated  
Paris CDG  5.26 
Stockholm Main  1.14 
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Table 8. Airport Codes  
Airport  Code  
Amsterdam  AMS 
Basel  BSL 
Berlin 
Schonefeld  
SXF 
Berlin Tegel TXL 
Billund  BLL 
Bremen BRE 
Brussels  BRU 
Charleroi  CRL 
Cologne CGN 
Dortmund DTM 
Dresden  DRS 
Dusseldorf DUS 
Eindhoven  EIN 
Erfurt  ERF 
Frankfurt Hahn  HHN 
Frankfurt Main  FRA 
Friedrichshafen FDH 
Hamburg HAM 
Hannover  HAJ 
Karlsruhe FKB 
Leipzig  LEJ 
Luxembourg  LUX 
Maastricht MST 
Metz  ETZ 
Munich MUC 
Munster FMO 
Nuremberg  NUE 
Paderborn PAD 
Prague  PRG 
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Rotterdam  RTM 
Saarbrucken  SCN 
Szczecin  SZZ 
Stuttgart STR 
Zurich  ZRH 
  
12 
 
Synthetic Control Models – Sample B  
Figure 1. Synthetic Control – Amsterdam Airport  
 
Figure 2. Synthetic Control – Basel Airport 
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Figure 3. Synthetic Control – Berlin Tegel Airport  
 
Figure 4. Synthetic Control – Billund Airport  
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Figure 5. Synthetic Control – Bremen Airport  
 
Figure 6. Synthetic Control – Charleroi Airport  
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Figure 7. Synthetic Control – Cologne Airport  
 
Figure 8. Synthetic Control – Dortmund  
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Figure 9. Synthetic Control - Dresden Airport  
 
Figure 10. Synthetic Control – Dusseldorf Airport  
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Figure 11. Synthetic Control – Eindhoven Airport  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Synthetic Control – Erfurt Airport  
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Figure 13. Synthetic Control – Frankfurt Hahn Airport  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Synthetic Control – Friedrichshafen Airport  
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Figure 15. Synthetic Control – Hamburg Airport  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Synthetic Control – Hannover Airport  
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Figure 17. Synthetic Control – Karlsruhe Airport  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Synthetic Control – Leipzig Airport  
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Figure 19. Synthetic Control – Luxembourg Airport  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Synthetic Control – Maastricht Airport  
 
22 
 
Figure 21. Synthetic Control – Metz Airport  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22. Synthetic Control – Munich Airport  
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Figure 23. Synthetic Control – Munster Airport  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24. Synthetic Control – Nuremberg Airport  
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Figure 25. Synthetic Control – Paderborn Airport  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26. Synthetic Control – Prague Airport  
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Figure 27. Synthetic Control – Rotterdam Airport  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28. Synthetic Control – Saarbrucken Airport  
 
26 
 
Figure 29. Synthetic Control – Stuttgart Airport  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30. Synthetic Control – Szczecin Airport  
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Figure 31. Synthetic Control – Zurich Airport  
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Synthetic Control Models – Sample A  
Figure 32. Synthetic Control – Amsterdam Airport  
 
Figure 33. Synthetic Control – Basel Airport  
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Figure 34. Synthetic Control – Billund Airport  
 
Figure 35. Synthetic Control – Bremen Airport  
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Figure 36. Synthetic Control – Brussels Airport  
 
Figure 37. Synthetic Control – Berlin Schonefeld  
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Figure 38. Synthetic Control – Berlin Tegel Airport  
 
Figure 39. Synthetic Control – Charleroi Airport  
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Figure 40. Synthetic Control – Cologne Airport  
 
Figure 41. Synthetic Control – Dortmund Airport  
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Figure 42. Synthetic Control – Dusseldorf Airport  
 
Figure 43. Synthetic Control – Dresden Airport  
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Figure 44. Synthetic Control – Eindhoven Airport  
 
Figure 45. Synthetic Control – Erfurt Airport  
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Figure 46. Synthetic Control – Frankfurt Hahn Airport  
 
Figure 47. Synthetic Control - Friedrichshafen Airport  
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Figure 48. Synthetic Control – Hamburg Airport  
 
Figure 49. Synthetic Control – Hannover Airport  
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
Figure 50. Synthetic Control – Karlsruhe Airport  
 
Figure 51. Synthetic Control – Leipzig Airport  
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Figure 52. Synthetic Control – Luxembourg Airport  
 
Figure 53. Synthetic Control - Maastricht Airport  
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Figure 54. Synthetic Control – Metz Airport  
 
Figure 55. Synthetic Control – Munich Airport  
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Figure 56. Synthetic Control – Munster Airport  
 
Figure 57. Synthetic Control – Nuremberg Airport  
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Figure 58. Synthetic Control – Saarbrucken Airport  
 
Figure 59. Synthetic Control – Stuttgart Airport  
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Figure 60. Synthetic Control – Szczecin Airport  
 
Figure 61. Synthetic Control – Zurich Airport  
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Synthetic Control: Placebo Tests (Sample A or B)  
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Robustness Check: Unadjusted Synthetic Controls for Dutch Airports2  
 
Figure 62. Synthetic Control – Amsterdam Airport (Unadjusted)  
 
Figure 63. Synthetic Control – Eindhoven Airport (Unadjusted)  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Adjustments were not used in the cases of Rotterdam and Maastricht airports, as the synthetic control model 
for the Dutch AT could not properly estimate counterfactuals for these airports.  
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Figure 64. Synthetic Control – Dutch AT Case - Amsterdam Airport  
 
Figure 65. Synthetic Control – Dutch AT Case – Eindhoven Airport  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
